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Bauknight et al.: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW
I.

STIPULATION REQUIRES CONSENT OF SOLICITOR

In State v. Anderson' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
charges of driving under the influence (DUI), driving under suspension (DUS),
and violation of the Habitual Traffic Offender Acte can be tried together at the
discretion of the trial court.3 Applying the rule of City of Greenville v.
Chapman,4 the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion to sever the habitual offender charge from the DUI and DUS counts.
In holding that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson's severance motion,"' the court of appeals interpreted the stipulation
provision of section 56-5-2980.6 The court's decision allows a solicitor to
reject a defendant's offer to stipulate to the jurisdiction of the general sessions
court on a second or further offense, thereby abrogating the apparent attempt
of the statute to allow a defendant to protect against admission of evidence of
a prior conviction.
John Anderson was indicted for DUS, DUI, and violation of the Habitual
Traffic Offender Act. He had been declared a habitual traffic offender as a
result of three DUI and DUS offenses.' The evidence offered at trial to prove
the habitual traffic offender violation was a letter from the South Carolina
Highway Department to Anderson notifying him that he had been declared a
habitual traffic offender.' The letter also "showed a record of the traffic
violations involving prior DUS and DUI charges that resulted in the habitual
traffic offender suspension. " '
The trial court denied Anderson's pretrial motion to sever the habitual
traffic offender charge from the DUI and DUS charges. Further, the judge

1.

__

S.C.

_,

458 S.E.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1995).

2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-1100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
3. Anderson, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 59. At the time of trial, these offenses were
classified as misdemeanors. Effective January 1, 1994, the habitual traffic offender (H.T.O.)
offense was reclassified as a felony. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-1100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
The court "intimate[d] no opinion concerning what impact, if any, the amended version of the
Habitual Traffic Offender Act may have upon this decision." Anderson, _ S.C. at_ n.1, 458
S.E.2d at 58 n.l.
4. 210 S.C. 157, 41 S.E.2d 865 (1947).
5. Anderson,_
S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 59.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2980 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (prescribing procedures for showing
a previous conviction of the defendant for reckless driving or for driving under the influence of
intoxicants, drugs, or narcotics).
7. Record at 5.
8. Anderson, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 57.
9. Id. at _,
458 S.E.2d at 57.
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instructed the jury to "limit any consideration of any alleged prior convictions
by [sic] the defendant only. . . to establish that this Court has the jurisdiction
or the right to try this case."' 0 Anderson was convicted on all three
counts."
The court of appeals applied Chapman'2 to determine whether the trial
court had abused its discretion in denying the motion for severance. The rule
in Chapman was stated by the Anderson court as follows: "Different
misdemeanors can be joined in the same indictment and tried together if they
(1) arise out of a single chain of circumstances, (2) can be proved by the same
evidence, (3) are of the same general nature, and (4) no real right of the
defendant will be jeopardized." 3
The court found that the first three factors were not in dispute and looked
solely to the fourth factor to determine the case. Specifically, the court looked
to Anderson's offer to stipulate to jurisdiction to see if any real right had been
jeopardized. The court stated that the solicitor rejected the stipulation. 4

10. Id. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 58 (alterations in original).
11. Id. at
458 S.E.2d at 57.
12. 210 S.C. 157, 41 S.E.2d 865 (1947).
13. Anderson, __ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 58.
14. Herein lies a problem. Examination of the record reveals that not only did the solicitor
not reject Anderson's offer to stipulate, but the trial judge might actually have acknowledged and
granted the stipulation. After a discussion of the offer to stipulate between the court and defense
counsel (in which the solicitor did not object to the stipulation), Record at 1-2, the following
exchange took place between the court and Anderson's attorney:
THE COURT: . .. So you're submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court for the trial
of the D.U.I. and the D.U.S.; right?
MR. FOWLER: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Understanding that the information [of prior convictions] has still got
to come in for the H.T.O.?
MR. FOWLER: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay.
Record at 2. From this exchange, it appears that the trial court granted the stipulation. The
discussion continued (after an interruption by the deputy sheriff) with Mr. Fowler reiterating the
stipulation and opening the topic of severance. It was only then that the solicitor objected to
defendant's motion to sever. The language of the opinion seems to indicate that the stipulation
.refusal" was brought out at oral argument: "Here, Anderson, as the record reflects and as
Anderson's counsel indicatedduring argument before this court, 'attempted to stipulate [to the]
jurisdiction [of the trial court] in this case;' however, the solicitor did not agree to so stipulate."
Anderson, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 58 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
Moreover, neither brief mentions the stipulation offer. It appears, then, that there was some
confusion at oral argument as to the stipulation. This might be explained by the fact that neither
of the attorneys present for trial, and thus represented in the record, actively participated on
appeal. The State was represented on appeal by the Attorney General's office, and the defendant
was represented on appeal by the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense. This is highly
unfortunate as it appears that the interpretation of the stipulation provision in the statute was
unnecessary under the facts of this case as set out in the record. No appeal was taken from the
decision of the court of appeals.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/9

2

Bauknight et al.: Criminal Law

19961

CRIMINAL LAW

According to the court, "[t]his meant that the state had to prove, so far as the
DUS and DUI charges were concerned, that the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction of the DUS and DUI charges for which Anderson was then being
tried."' 5 The court then determined that, "[aibsent a stipulation [agreed upon
by both parties] as to subject matter jurisdiction, Anderson had no real right
to object to the admission into evidence of his prior DUS and DUI convictions. "16
The court then stated that because the defendant had failed to argue that
the solicitor should be required to give assent to such a stipulation, it could
not, "as much as [it] might wish to do so, hold the solicitor's assent was not
required."' 7 In spite of this disclaimer, the court proceeded to cite cases
defining stipulation as "an agreement between the parties to which there must
be mutual assent."' In a footnote, the court further stated that "[tjhe plain
meaning of the statute. . . suggests that the solicitor must assent before a
stipulation is effective, otherwise
the legislature would not have included the
19
words ['with the solicitor']."
The dissent rejected the court's reasoning regarding the solicitor's
requisite consent. The dissent pointed out that because the prosecution's
interest would rarely be served by agreeing to stipulate to the jurisdictional
foundation, the majority's interpretation of the statute abrogates the intent of
the statute to give the option to the defendant." The dissent quoted from
Chapman for the proposition that "'[c]ircumstances might arise which would
render a uniting of several counts unjust to the defendant.""'' The dissent
offered a more appropriate test to determine whether circumstances require
severance in order to prevent prejudice: "In more modern terms, the analysis
involves a weighing of the State's interest in judicial economy against the
possible prejudice to the defendant." 22 Finding that the judicial economy
served by a denial of severance was minimal and the prejudice resulting from
a denial of the severance was obvious, the dissent would have reversed on
grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion.'
The stipulation provision of section 56-5-2980 had never been put in issue
on appeal prior to Anderson. It was, however, mentioned by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Tyler v. State.24 In Tyler the defendant was
15. Anderson, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 58.
16. Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 58.
17. Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 58.
18. Id. at
458 S.E.2d at 58 (quoting State v. Parra, 859 P.2d 1231, 1238 (Wash. 1993)).
19. Id. at _ n.2, 458 S.E.2d at 58 n.2. The court's efforts to define stipulation as requiring
the solicitor's assent are technically dicta.
20. Id. at
, 458 S.E.2d at 59 (Howard, J.,
dissenting).
21. Id. at _,458 S.E.2d at 59-60 (quoting Chapman, 210 S.C. at 162, 41 S.E.2d at 867).
22. Id. at _,458 S.E.2d at 60.
23. Id. at __,458 S.E.2d at 61.
24. 247 S.C. 34, 39, 145 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1965). Section 46-349 was recodified as section

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

indicted for a thirteenth DUI offense. "The indictment set forth the time and
place of the previous twelve convictions of the petitioner for driving and
operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor."'
On appeal Tyler claimed the jurors were prejudiced against him because his
previous offenses were detailed in the indictment.26 The court found that
"the allegation of the indictment that the crime charged was a second or
subsequent offense was necessary to show the jurisdiction of the court. 2 7
The court explained the general rule that even possible prejudice to a
defendant upon an "'averment of his previous conviction

. . .

cannot override

the necessity of making such allegation on the question of a more severe
penalty for a subsequent offense, and such an averment is usually regarded as
authorized, and not to violate the constitutional or statutory rights of
accused.' "28 Most importantly, however, the court held that the defendant's
failure to avail "himself of the provisions of the

. . .

statute and stipulate[

with the Solicitor that the charge against him constituted a second or further
offense "2 made unavailable habeas corpus proceedings to correct the alleged
errors of prejudicial evidence.3" Although the court did not address the issue
directly, Tyler might be interpreted to indicate-in line with the Anderson
dissent-that the stipulation is entirely in the hands of the defendant.
Because there are no other South Carolina cases on the issue, it is
necessary to examine other resources for guidance as to the application of
stipulations in criminal proceedings. In agreement with State v. Parra,3' the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Ford32 remarked: "A
stipulation is an agreement between counsel with respect to business before a
court. .

.

. However, it is not the duty or function of a trial court to require

one of the parties to the litigation to stipulate with his adversary.
Furthermore, "[i]t has been held that, in a criminal proceeding, the state has
the right to prove every element of the crime charged and is not obligated to
rely on the defendant's stipulation."" 4

56-5-2980.
25. Id. at 35, 145 S.E.2d at 434.
26. Id. at 36, 145 S.E.2d at 435.
27. Id. at 37, 145 S.E.2d at 435.
28. Id. at 38, 145 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 126
(1991)).
29. Id. at 39, 145 S.E.2d at 436.
30. Id.
31. 859 P.2d 1231 (Wash. 1993). Parra is cited in Anderson for the proposition that a
stipulation requires the "mutual assent" of parties. Anderson, __ S.C. at_, 458 S.E.2d at 58.
32. 725 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
33. Id. at 691 (citations omitted).
34. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Stipulations § 17 (1974).
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In the absence of statutory guidance similar to section 56-5-2980, cases
fall on both sides of the issue-some refusing to require the prosecutor to
agree to stipulate to a prior conviction35 and others placing the decision only
with the defendant and the court. 6 Stipulation to prior convictions arises
most often in cases of felony possession of a firearm in which the prior
conviction is necessary to prove an element of the crime. In State v.
Hudson37 the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to require the trial court
to accept defendant's offer to stipulate to his prior felony convictions.3
Likewise, in State v. Wilson39 the prosecutor refused to agree to stipulate to
a prior felony conviction. The Kansas court pointed out that it had repeatedly
allowed admission of evidence "otherwise relevant in a criminal prosecution"
even if the evidence proved "a crime other than that charged. It is an
established rule of law that an admission by a defendant does not prevent the
state from presenting separate and independent proof of the fact admitted. "I
The court then quoted the prevailing rule: "'The making of an admission by
the defendant does not bar the prosecution from proving the fact independently
thereof as though no admission had been made, particularly since facts when
voluntarily admitted often lose much of their probative force in the eyes of the
jury."41
The key factor in cases like Wilson and Hudson, however, is that the prior
convictions prove an element of the offense of felony possession of a
firearm-the very existence of a prior felony. In the Anderson scenario the
prior convictions for DUS and DUI go only to prove the non-elemental
jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, this distinction and the existence of
statutory guidance force a conclusion that the general rule that "the government is not required to accept an offer by the defense to stipulate to the facts
42
of a case and may insist on proving all essential elements of its case"
35. See, e.g., United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 335
(1993); United States v. Campbell, 774 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rodriguez,
No. Si 94 Cr. 313 (CSH), 1995 WL 9390 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1995) (mem.); United States v.
Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1987); People v. Martin, 707 P.2d 1005 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985), aff'd, 738 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1987); Arrington v. State, 233 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1970); State
v. Wilson, 523 P.2d 337 (Kan. 1974); State v. Hudson, 281 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1979); State
v. Dickens, 647 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1982); State v. Morris, 641 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983); State v. Adler, 558 P.2d 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994); State v. Leonard, 725 P.2d
493 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); People v. McGriff, 205 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1984); State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 1984);
State v. McAllister, 451 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
37. 281 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1979).
38. Id. at 873.
39. 523 P.2d 337 (Kan. 1974):
40. Id. at 341 (citations omitted).
41. Id. (quoting 12 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 399 (1972)).
42. People v. Martin, 707 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 738 P.2d 789
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should not apply to Anderson or cases like it. The usual purpose behind
allowing the prosecution to refuse to stipulate relates to the nature of unfairly
prejudicial evidence.
[Elvidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it tends to have some adverse
effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that
justified its admission into evidence. Accordingly, a prior conviction is
not unfairly prejudicial where the prior conviction is an element of the
crime.
Every... circuit deciding the issue has concurred that the government
need not accept the defendant's offer to stipulate to the prior conviction
element of the crime charged .... Thus, case law recognizes the practical
necessity that the jury have before it a context in which to decide a case.
In addition, there exists a moral necessity that the jury hear evidence
relating to all non-jurisdictionalelements of the offense .... 43
This analysis further supports protecting the defendant from juror prejudice by
giving the defendant an exclusive option to stipulate.
Some courts, however, have required prosecutors to accept defendants'
stipulations even when the prior conviction is an essential element of the
offense. In State v. Berkelman" the charge was aggravated DWI, and the
governing statute increased the crime from misdemeanor to gross misdemeanor
if the defendant had a prior conviction for DWI. Thus, the prosecution was
required to prove the prior conviction as an element of the gross misdemeanor
charge. "[T]he prior conviction is an element which the state must prove at
trial and which defendant has a right to have a jury decide. However, it does
not follow that the defendant can do nothing to keep the potentially prejudicial
evidence of his prior conviction from the jury." 4 The court pointed out that
in the majority of such cases the "'potential of the evidence for unfair
prejudice clearly outweighs its probative value. " 46 The balancing test the
court applied compared "'the potential of the evidence for unfair prejudice
with the relevance of the evidence to issues other than the issue to which the
stipulation relates.'" 47 The court held that the trial judge erred in not

(Colo. 1987).
43. Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting
Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 528-30 (1995) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
44. 355 N.W.2d 394, 395 (Minn. 1984).
45. Id. at 396.
46. Id. (quoting State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1984)).
47. Id. at 397 (quoting Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at 11-12).
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accepting the stipulation of the prior conviction; however, "the error was not
so prejudicial as to require a new trial."48
The circumstances in Berkelman are strikingly similar to those in
Anderson. The statute in Berkelman required proof of a prior conviction for
increased penalty; the evidence was the innocuous testimony of the deputy
court clerk49 (although in Anderson, the evidence was perhaps even more
innocuous in the form of a letter from the highway department 0 ); the court
gave a limiting instruction to the jury;5' and the prosecutor did not "try to
use the prior conviction improperly in either his opening or closing statement."52 The Berkelman court's analysis applies with even greater ease to
the facts of Anderson. Anderson's prior convictions were unnecessary to
prove an element of the offense of DUI. Application of the Berkelman
balancing test to Anderson reveals no "relevance of the evidence to issues
other than the issue to which the stipulation relates. " " Yet, as the court
stated in Berkleman:
When the jury is told that a defendant charged with the act of driving
while under the influence has a prior conviction for driving while under
the influence, the risk is considerable that the jury will use the evidence in
determining whether the defendant is guilty of the charged act of driving
while under the influence. Evidence of a prior act of driving while under
the influence is ordinarily not admissible against a defendant in a
prosecution for driving while under the influence ....

If a defendant is

willing to concede that he has a prior DWI conviction, we fail to see why
the evidence, with its great potential for being improperly used, should be
admitted, unless, of course, the evidence is admissible ...
relevant to some disputed issue.54

as evidence

Moreover, when, as in South Carolina, the legislature has seen fit to provide
by statute a stipulation procedure for just such a case (DUI), it would seem
that due process would require the court to use the procedure to protect
defendants such as Anderson from undue prejudice.
Only Oregon has had a similar statutory provision for stipulation to prior
DUI convictions. 5 The statute, however, was repealed in 1981 for unreport-

48. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 395.
Anderson,__ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 57.
Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d at 395; Anderson, - S.C. at _,
Berkelnan, 355 N.W.2d at 395.
Id. at 397 (quoting Davidson, 351 N.W.2d at 11-12).
Id. at 397 n.2 (citations omitted).

458 S.E.2d at 58.

55. OR. REV. STAT. § 484.365 (1994), repealed by 1981 c. 803 § 26. The text of the statute

may be found in State v. Winters, 578 P.2d 439, 441 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
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ed reasons. 6 The Oregon statute included a provision to solve a problem
like that in Anderson. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(1) In a prosecution under [the traffic crime statute], the state,
municipality or political subdivision shall plead and prove the previous
conviction unless the defendant stipulates to that fact prior to trial. If the
defendant so stipulates and the trial is by jury:
(a) The court shall accept the stipulation regardlessof whether or not
the state, municipality orpolitical subdivision agrees to it. 7
If, as the Anderson dissent suggested, the South Carolina legislature meant to
give the stipulation option to the defendant notwithstanding the assent of the
solicitor, the remedy now would be an amendment adding the above-quoted
and emphasized language of the Oregon statute.
Laying aside the stipulation issue and looking only at the question of
severance, a review of other jurisdictions reveals a divided stand on severance
of such offenses. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Shuman v. State58
affirmed a trial court's denial of severance on facts similar to those in
Anderson. Shuman was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated (DWI) resulting in the death of another person (a felony) and
driving with a suspended license (a misdemeanor).59 He was acquitted of a
charge of recdess homicide (a felony).' The defendant wanted to sever the
DUS charge from the reckless homicide and DWI-resulting-in-death charges
to keep evidence of his driving record and license suspension from the jury.
Indiana has a statute that considers virtually the same factors as South
Carolina's Chapman decision. 6' The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Two (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or
information, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the
offenses:
(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single
scheme or plan; or

56. Oregon has retained, however, a statute that is identical to the stipulation provision for
a previous-conviction element in an aggravated murder case. OR. REv. STAT. § 163.103 (1990).
Interestingly, this aggravated murder statute was enacted the same year the traffic statute on
stipulations was repealed, 1981.

57. OR. REv. STAT. § 484.380 (1975) (second emphasis added), quoted in Winters, 578 P.2d

at 441.
58. 489 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
59. Id. at 127.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected
62
together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.
The Indiana statute that authorizes severance provides, in pertinent part:
"Whenever two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial in the same
indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of the same
or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the
offenses. In all other cases the court, upon motion of the defendant or the
prosecutor, shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court
determines that severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of
the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense considering:
(1) the number of offenses charged;
(2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and
(3)whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and
apply the law intelligently as to each offense. 63
The Shuman court first determined that the offenses charged were based on the
same or similar conduct, not character; thus, the court had to apply the
statutory factors to determine whether severance was authorized.' Ultimately affirming the convictions, the court relied in part on the rule of Douglas v.
State:65 "[I]t [i]s

. .

. not error to refuse to sever where all the evidence of

one crime would have been admissible as to the other crime."' "Thus, the
charges, which arose from the same conduct, required proof of one common
element and a number of dissimilar elements." 67 Because the evidence was
"not complex nor easily confused .

. . ,

the decision not to sever was not

clearly erroneous pursuant to the statutory factors. "68
Applying this rule to the facts of Anderson, the evidence of prior
convictions was necessary to show the jurisdiction of the court as to the DUI
and DUS, necessary as an element of the DUS to the extent the letter from the
highway department proved the suspension, and necessary as an element of the
habitual traffic offender charge. Even though there were also dissimilar
elements, the charges arose from the same conduct and required proof of at
least one common element-Anderson's previous convictions as evidenced by
the letter notifying Anderson of the revocation of driving privileges. Thus, it

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

IND. CODE § 35-4-1-9 (1981), quoted in Shuman, 489 N.E.2d at 127.
IND. CODE § 35-34-1-11 (1981), quoted in Shuman, 489 N.E.2d at 127.
Shuman, 489 N.E.2d at 127-28.
464 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. 1984).
Shuman, 489 N.E.2d at 128.

67. Id.
68. Id.
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would appear the South Carolina Court of Appeal's decision is consistent with
judicial thinking in Indiana.
Also supportive of the Anderson decision is State v. Campbell.69 There
the defendant was charged with DUI, operating a motor vehicle while
adjudged an habitual offender, and negligent homicide.70 As in Anderson,
the defendant moved to sever the habitual offender charge.7' The severance
statute in Montana reads, in pertinent part: "If it appears that a defendant or
the state is prejudiced by a joinder of related prosecutions . . . the court may
order separate trials . . . or provide any other relief as justice may re-

quire." 72 The Montana court analyzed the case under a test for three basic
kinds of prejudice: (1) when accumulation of evidence tends to create the
impression the defendant is a bad man; (2) "when proof of guilt on the first
count. . . is used to convict the defendant of a second count even though the
proof would be inadmissible at a separate trial on the second count" ;73 and
(3) "when the defendant wishes to testify on his own behalf on one charge but
not on another."'

The court weighed "the prejudice incurred by the

defendant because of a joint trial against the judicial economy resulting from
a joint trial. "I
Applying that balancing test, the court found that the
defendant had not proven he was sufficiently prejudiced by the joint, trial.
[I]t has been specifically held that the prejudice incurred by a defendant
from being held out to the jury as an "habitual offender" is not alone
sufficient to entitle the defendant to separate trials.
We agree that the mere inclusion of an habitual offender count in an
information is insufficient to automatically require severance of that charge
from other charges. It would be contrary to the considerations of judicial
economy set out above to require separate trials whenever one count of an
information charges a party with being an habitual offender. That would
be especially true in this case where all the charges stemmed from the
same incident ....

To grant severance would require essentially the

same evidence
about the same occurrence to be introduced at two different
6
trials.

7

This argument applies to the facts of Anderson as well. In fact, in Anderson
the State argued: "[U]nder Appellant's theory of the case, the lower courts

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

615 P.2d 190 (Mont. 1980).
Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-404(4) (1995), quoted in Campbell, 615 P.2d at 198.
Canpbell, 615 P.2d at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 198-99.
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would be required to hold a separate trial every time a person violated the
Habitual Traffic Offender statute-one trial for the offense which constituted
the violation (DUI or DUS), and a separate trial for the violation of the HTO
Act itself. "77
Other jurisdictions, however, have resolved the issue by requiring
bifurcation of the guilt and sentencing phases of habitual offender trials. The
applicable statutes, however, govern only felonies. 78 Because the habitual
traffic offender offense in South Carolina has been upgraded to felony status,
it may be that bifurcation would be prudent here as well.
The dissent in Anderson also raised the question of the constitutionality
of the joinder of offenses. The United States Supreme Court, however, in
Spencer v. Texas,79 refused to interfere with the promulgation of state rules
of criminal procedure, saying that the "prejudicial effect [of joinder] ...is

justified on the grounds that (1) the jury is expected to follow instructions in
limiting this evidence to its proper function, and (2) the convenience of trying
different crimes against the same person

. . .

is a valid governmental interest."

The Court upheld as not violative of due process Texas's habitual criminal
offender procedure of including in the indictment allegations of prior offenses
and introduction of past convictions when the jury was charged that the prior
convictions are not to be considered in assessing defendant's guilt or
innocence.8 0 As for any possible violation of the South Carolina Constitution, there is no case law supporting the dissent's contention of a violation of
the right to a fair and impartial trial. Though not unconstitutional, it appears
the court of appeals has created the opportunity for defendants to be prejudiced
when solicitors refuse to accept stipulations to the jurisdiction of the court
under the stipulation provision of the statute.
In conclusion, while it may be true that no real right of the defendant was
jeopardized as to the DUS charge because the stipulation provision does not
apply to a charge of DUS, the same cannot not clearly be said for the DUI
charge. It is unclear whether the statute was meant to protect against
admission of prior convictions on a DUI charge if the defendant alone
stipulated to the jurisdiction of the court. However, because the motion for
severance would have kept the DUS and the DUI together, any error would
appear to have been harmless even had the solicitor been required to accept
the stipulation because the jurisdiction of the court over the DUS would still
have been proved with evidence of prior convictions. Also, presumably the

77.
78.
(Supp.
79.
80.

Respondent's Final Brief at 8-9.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-502 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-103
1995).
385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967).
Id. at 559-69.
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prior convictions that resulted in suspension of Anderson's license would also
be admissible as evidence of the suspension on the DUS charge.
The court of appeals' decision finds support in several jurisdictions, both
as to construction of the stipulation provision and as to severance generally.
There are, however, many cases in support of the alternate position as to both
issues. If the legislature intended the stipulation provision to allow defendants
to take from the prosecution the sword of prior convictions, it must now
amend the statute to re-establish that intent. Moreover, now that violation of
the Habitual Traffic Offender Act constitutes a felony, it is questionable
whether Chapman would apply if the Anderson trial were held today.
Suzanne H. Bauknight
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COURTS STRUGGLE TOWARDS A UNIFORM APPROACH FOR
RESOLVING DOUBLE JEOPARDY ISSUES IN CONSPIRACY CASES

In State v. Barroso the South Carolina Court of Appeals held, inter
alia,2 that appellant Bobby Bell was not subjected to double jeopardy by being
prosecuted for trafficking in cocaine after having been acquitted of trafficking
in marijuana, a charge that arose out of dealings with some of the same
people, during some of the same time periods, and in some of the same
geographical areas.3
The statewide grand jury returned an indictment against Bell in September
of 1990 for trafficking in marijuana.' Specifically, the counts alleged that the
trafficking occurred in Darlington, Florence, Lee, and Richland Counties and
in the State of Texas from February of 1990 until September of 1990. Bell was
acquitted of these charges.' In November of 1990, another indictment was
returned against Bell for trafficking in cocaine.6 This second indictment
alleged that the trafficking occurred in Darlington, Florence, and Lee Counties
and in the State of Florida from June 1, 1988 to October 31, 1990.' Bell was
convicted of trafficking in cocaine, and on appeal he argued that the
prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because both
prosecutions arose from the same conspiracy and course of conduct.'

1. __ S.C. _, 462 S.E.2d 862 (Ct. App. 1995).
2. Barrosoinvolved seven appellants who were all convicted of trafficking in excess of 400
grams of cocaine. In addition to double jeopardy, they each appealed various aspects of their
trial, including: sufficiency of evidence; admission of evidence of other drug-related bad acts;
refusal to grant a mistrial despite the jury's exposure to hearsay evidence; admission of improper
impeachment testimony; improper jury charge; refusal to allow presentation of constitutional
claims after the verdict; argument that the cocaine trafficking cocaine statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause (because it discriminates against those who are predisposed to use drugs); and
argument that the cocaine trafficking statute (which denies defendant the opportunity to participate
in supervised furlough, extended work release, and parole) violates S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
Id. All of the convictions were affirmed except that of James Napoleon Smith, which was
reversed because the state failed to present sufficient evidence for conviction. Id. at _, 462
S.E.2d at 867-870.
462 S.E.2d at 870-872.
3. Id. at _,
4. This indictment was returned pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(e)(1)(b)-(c) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1995). Barroso, _ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 870.
5. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 870.
6. This indictment was returned pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(e)(2)(e) (Law. Coop. Supp. 1995). Barroso, _ S.C. at
, 462 S.E.2d at 870.
870.
7. Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at
8. Brief of Appellant at 3.
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The court of appeals approached the double jeopardy question by applying
the analysis announced in Grady v. Corbin.9 Even though this test had been
overturned by the United States Supreme Court,' 0 the court of appeals
deferred to the two-step Grady test because Grady was the applicable law
when Bell was tried and convicted." The first element of Grady is set forth
in Blockburger v. United States' 2 and is used to determine if "the offenses
have identical statutory elements or [if] one is a lesser-included offense of the
other."' 3 If the court finds that either of these elements is satisfied, "the
inquiry must cease and the subsequent prosecution is barred."14 If the
prosecution survives the Blockburgeranalysis, the second step is to determine
if "the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in
that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted."'"
By analogy to State v. Wilson,' 6 which was decided on almost identical
facts, the court of appeals determined that the Blockburger test did not bar
Bell's subsequent prosecution.' 7 Specifically, the court noted that in Wilson
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that trafficking in marijuana and
trafficking in cocaine were not lesser-included offenses of each other.' 8 The
court of appeals then applied the second test in Grady and found that "[t]he
entirety of the conduct sought to be established in the [trafficking-in-marijuana]
case. . . does not establish any single element" of the trafficking-in-cocaine
case." The court pointed out that the prosecutions involved different
controlled substances and that the elements of conspiracy were proved by
different conduct.2' The application of these two tests would complete the
analysis in double jeopardy cases not involving conspiracy charges. In State
v. Dasher,2' however, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted an
additional totality-of-the-circumstances test for conspiracy cases. The Dasher

9. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
10. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993).
11. Barroso, _ S.C. at _ n.6, 462 S.E.2d at 871 n.6. The court of appeals applied this
analysis to give Bell the extra protection of Grady's "entirety-of-the-conduct" test. It should also
be noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the same-conduct test four years before
Grady was decided. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
12. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
13. Grady, 495 U.S. at 516.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 521.
16. 311 S.C. 382, 429 S.E.2d 453 (1993).
17. Barroso, - S.C. at_, 462 S.E.2d at 871.
18. Id. at
, 462 S.E.2d at 871.
19. Id. at
, 462 S.E.2d at 871.
20. Id. at
462 S.E.2d at 871.
21. 278 S.C. 454, 298 S.E.2d 215 (1982).
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analysis requires consideration of the following factors to determine whether
one or two conspiracies existed:
(1) the time periods covered by the alleged conspiracies; (2) the places
where the conspiracies are alleged to have occurred; (3)the persons
charged as conspirators; (4) the overt acts alleged to have been committed
in furtherance of the conspiracies, or any other descriptions of the offenses
charged which indicate the nature and scope of the activities being
prosecuted; and (5) the substantive statutes alleged to have been violated. 22
Applying these factors, the Barroso court determined that "these were two
distinct conspiracies with distinct co-conspirators, distinct time periods, distinct
places of operation, distinct offenses and distinct overt acts."'
The first step in the Grady analysis, the Blockburgertest, has been a pillar
in double jeopardy jurisprudence for over six decades, and not surprisingly,
the court of appeals had no difficulty in relying upon it in the Barroso case.
Perhaps the best attribute of this test is its simplicity. As stated by Justice
Sutherland in Blockburger, the question "is whether each [statute] requires
proof of a fact which the other does not."24
As noted above, the Barroso court relied on State v. Wilson,' 5 which
held that neither trafficking in cocaine nor trafficking in marijuana was a
lesser-included offense of the other,26 implying that each offense requires
proof of an element that the other does not. A simple comparison of the plain
language of the trafficking statutes supports the Wilson holding. Section 44-53370(e)(1)(b) requires proof of trafficking 100 or more pounds of marijuana,
but section 44-53-370(e)(2)(e) requires proof of trafficking 400 or more grams
of cocaine.
The Barroso court's application of the Grady "same-conduct" test is also
consistent with precedent. In Grady the United States Supreme Court asked if
the state, in order to prove an essential element of the case at bar, would
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant had already
been tried.2' The defendant in Grady had already plead guilty to the traffic
offenses of driving while intoxicated and driving left of center." The State
of New York subsequently attempted to prosecute the defendant for reckless
manslaughter, second degree vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Barroso, _ S.C. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at _, 462 S.E.2d at 872.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
311 S.C. 382, 429 S.E.2d 453 (1993).
Id. at 385, 429 S.E.2d at 454.
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990).
Id. at 511-12.
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homicide, and third degree reckless assault.29 Filing a bill of particulars, the
state averred that it would prove the defendant was driving while intoxicated
and left of center to establish the elements of recklessness and negligence.3
The Court precluded prosecution for the homicide and assault offenses
because, in order to establish elements of these offenses, the State would have
to prove conduct for which the defendant had already been tried. 3
The Barroso court relied on Wilson and found that the State did not prove
the conduct of the trafficking-in-marijuana offense to establish any element of
the trafficking-in-cocaine offense.32 By following the Grady analysis, it is
obvious that even if the State wanted to use the conduct33 sought to be proved
in the trafficking-in-marijuana trial, this conduct would not have proven any
of the elements in the trafficking-in-cocaine trial.
Thus, the two-step approach of Grady appears rather straightforward. The
totality-of-the-circumstances test is not as easy to apply. Although several of
the federal circuit courts and state supreme courts have applied the totality-of-34
the-circumstances test to the double jeopardy analysis of conspiracy cases,
these courts offer very little guidance as to how each of the five factors should
be considered. Of course, the determination always rests upon whether the
court believes that the same overall agreement (to act in a criminal fashion)
among the parties was involved in the multiple prosecutions. 35 If so, the
multiple prosecutions will be considered to involve the same conspiracy "no
matter how variegated the criminal purposes contemplated in the agree-

29. Id. at 513.
30. Id. at 523.
31. Id. However, the Court noted that this did not bar the State from prosecuting the
defendant on these charges if the State did not rely on conduct for which Grady had already been
convicted. Id. Specifically, if the State attempted to establish recklessness and negligence by
showing that the defendant was driving too fast in heavy rain (as was also alleged in the bill of
particulars), double jeopardy problems would not exist. Id.
, 462 S.E.2d at 871.
32. Barroso, _ S.C. at
33. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, made clear that the entirety of the conduct did
not equate with "same evidence." Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521-22 (1990). The use of
specific evidence at one trial does not preclude its use at another. Id. Rather, the focus must be
will use to prove that
placed on "what conduct the State will prove [and] not the evidence [it]
conduct." Id. at 521.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Okolie, 3 F.3d 287 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that two separate
conspiracies existed under the totality-of-the-circumstances test when there was a partial overlap
in time, different co-conspirators, indictments under the same statutes, different overt acts, and
different geographic locations), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1203 (1994); United States v. Bryan, 896
F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that one conspiracy existed under the totality-of-thecircumstances test when there was a partial overlap in time, some different co-conspirators,
indictments under the same statutes, similar overt acts, and some similar geographic locations).
35. See State v. Dasher, 278 S.C. 454, 456, 298 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1982).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/9

16

Bauknight et al.: Criminal Law

1996]

CRIMINAL LAW

ment." 3 6 However, a closer look at the totality-of-the-circumstances test as
applied in South Carolina reveals that one factor trumps the others.
Beginning with Dasher, in which South Carolina adopted the totality-ofthe-circumstances test,37 consideration of the substantive statutes alleged to
have been violated, the fifth factor, seems to take precedence over the other
four factors. In Dasher the defendants were indicted twice for conspiracy to
transport, store, and distribute a controlled substance-once for marijuana and
once for cocaine.3" At the time of the indictment, a single South Carolina
statute proscribed these activities.39 The South Carolina Supreme Court
determined that the marijuana and cocaine counts constituted a single
conspiracy and that double jeopardy applied40 even though the other factors
pointed towards different conspiracies. The handling of the two drugs involved
some but not all of the same people; overlapped in time for only four months;
involved the two different overt acts of transporting cocaine and transporting
marijuana; and partially occurred in two different places-the cocaine came
from Florida while the marijuana came from Texas. 4
Similarly, in State v. Amerson42 the defendants were indicted twice for
conspiring to traffic in marijuana under the same statute.43 The South
Carolina Supreme Court determined that this constituted one conspiracy even
though the conspiracies did not overlap in time; involved some but not all of
the same people; and the method of transportation and distribution varied
somewhat. 44
However, in State v. Wilson,45 which the court of appeals relied upon
in Barroso, the South Carolina Supreme Court determined that two separate
conspiracies existed when the defendants were indicted under different statutes
of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.46
The Wilson court distinguished the case from Dasherby noting that separate
substantive statutes were involved.47
The court of appeals appeared to use some form of this trumping
mechanism in Barroso by focusing on the substantive statutes alleged to have

36. Id. (quoting Annotation, Several Conspiraciesas PredicableUpon Single Agreement to
Commit Several Offenses, 87 L. ED. 29, 47 (1942)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 455, 298 S.E.2d at 216.
39. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-410 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (defining "conspiracy")).
40. Id. at 456, 298 S.E.2d at 217.
41. Id.
42. 311 S.C. 316, 428 S.E.2d 871 (1993).
43. Id. at 317-18, 428 S.E.2d at 872.
44. Id. at 320, 428 S.E.2d at 873-874.
45. 311 S.C. 382, 429 S.E.2d 453 (1993).
46. Id. at 386-387, 429 S.E.2d at 455-456.
47. Id.
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been violated. The court's only reference to the totality-of-the-circumstances
test was in the statement "that these were two distinct conspiracies with
distinct co-conspirators, distinct time periods, distinct places of operation,
distinct offenses and distinct overt acts." 48 In contrast to this brief mention
of Dasher's first four factors, the Barroso court drew upon statutory
distinctions throughout its opinion. Furthermore, the conspiracies in question
did seem to involve different overt acts, some different co-conspirators, and
some different geographical areas. 49 However, the time span of the second
conspiracy (trafficking in cocaine) was entirely overlapped by the first
(trafficking in marijuana), for which Bell was acquitted."
Barroso possibly changes the double jeopardy analysis by South Carolina
courts. This decision implies that the same-conduct test would be abandoned
in analysing conduct that occurred after the United States v. Dixon ruling.5
Essentially, the Dixon decision overturned the same-conduct test of Grady v.
Corbin,52 leaving the Blockburgertest to determine what constitutes the same
offense. 3 The Court's reasons for overturning Grady included the belief that
the test lacked constitutional roots, 54 contradicted an unbroken line of
decisions, and produced confusion.55
However, it is possible the South Carolina Supreme Court would not
reject the same-conduct test. After all, in State v. Grampus,5 6 decided a full
four years before Grady, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted its own
same-conduct test. On the other hand, perhaps the South Carolina Supreme
Court would apply an analysis resembling Barroso's. The likelihood of a
Barroso approach becomes more plausible when one considers that the test
adopted in Grampus was not based on any provision of the Constitution of
South Carolina but on dictum from a United States Supreme Court decision. 7

48. Barroso, __ S.C. at _,
462 S.E.2d at 872.
49. Id. at
, 462 S.E.2d at 870-872.

50. Id. at,
462 S.E.2d at 870.
51. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. For a detailed
and helpful discussion of the evolution of double jeopardy law, see William S. McAninch,
Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REv. 411 (1993).
52. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
53. 113 S. Ct. at 2860. This overruling had no effect on the totality-of-the-circumstances test
for conspiracies.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2864.
56. 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986). The South Carolina test in Grampus was quite
similar to the Grady same-conduct test.
57. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980). When the defendant was convicted of failing to
reduce speed to avoid an accident and subsequently faced manslaughter charges, the Court in
Vitale suggested that "if in the pending manslaughter prosecution [the state relied] on and
prove[d] a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter
.. . [the defendant] would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy." Id. at 421.
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All that is certain right now is that the South Carolina Court of Appeals has
taken a definite position. In Barroso the court of appeals suggested that it
would not have had any reluctance in abandoning the same-conduct test if
appellant Bell had been tried after Grady had been overturned.5"
PatrickKeith McCarthy

58. See Barroso,

_

S.C. at

__
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III.

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

DNA STATISTICAL

EVIDENCE UNDER STATE V. DINKIN

The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the admission of population
frequency statistics for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test results in State v.
Dinkins.' Although this decision is a rational progression in South Carolina
law and is consistent with many other jurisdictions, the opinion left many
questions unanswered and left the future of DNA evidence in dispute.
Dinkins was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct, first degree
burglary, and armed robbery. 2 The victim was a seventy-eight-year-old
woman, and the attack took place in her bedroom. Although she was unable
to identify Dinkins outright, she described a medallion worn by her attacker,
which was similar to one owned by Dinkins, and identified her attacker as
having "black speech." 3 Dinkins is black.
Police were unable to confirm the attacker's identity from a partial
fingerprint lifted from a window screen. However, the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division (SLED) performed DNA analysis on semen samples
taken from the victim's bed sheets, and the test resulted in a match with
Dinkins' DNA. 4 A SLED DNA expert testified that the probability of finding
Dinkins' particular DNA pattern in an unrelated individual selected randomly
in South Carolina was one in 2.9 billion in the black population and one in 4.2
billion in the white population.' After an in camera hearing, the trial judge
6
ruled that the statistical evidence was admissible.

1. __ S.C.
2. Id. at
3. Id. at

462 S.E.2d 59 (1995).
462 S.E.2d at 59.
462 S.E.2d at 59.

__,

,

4. Id. at
, 462 S.E.2d at 59. DNA is the long, double-stranded molecule that resembles
a twisted ladder and is found in the chromosomes of every nucleated cell. See State v. Ford, 301
S.C. 485, 487, 392 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1990); Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of
DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R.4TH 313, 319 (1991). Each side of the ladder is
composed of a chain of sugars and phosphates, and the approximately three billion "rungs"
attached to them consist of pairs of molecules called "bases." Fleming, supra note 6, at 319.
These bases (individually known as adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine) each bond with only
one of the other bases. Id. The order of the four bases along the DNA molecule creates the
genetic code, which itself dictates the production of proteins that make up an organism. Id.
Although most sections of a chain of bases are largely the same, "certain sections are variable
or 'polymorphic,' meaning that they may take different forms in different individuals." Id.
Because of these polymorphisms in human genetic structure, "no two individuals (except for
identical twins) have identical base sequences throughout their DNA." Id. Thus, DNA analysis
arguably makes it possible to identify a specific person to the practical exclusion of all others.
5. Id. at

,

462 S.E.2d at 59.

6. Id. at _,462 S.E.2d at 60.
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The admissibility of evidence derived from DNA identification or "fingerprinting" techniques is one of the most controversial issues in the law today.
Two kinds of DNA tests are currently in forensic use. 7
Both methodologies involve the isolation, identification, and comparison of
certain highly distinguishing characteristics in the genetic structure of
individuals, as revealed by an analysis of DNA extracted from body fluid
or tissue samples, and a statistical calculation of the frequency with which
such characteristics could be expected to appear in the population. 8
DNA testing "has been advanced as a uniquely effective means (1)to link
a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left; (2) to resolve disputed parentage in paternity,
immigration, and other cases; and (3) to identify human remains."' Although
DNA identification may offer significant advantages over traditional means of
biological identification,'0 many serious questions have been raised about its
reliability and acceptability as evidence in legal proceedings.
RFLP analysis is the most widely used method of DNA matching. The
procedure requires the extraction of an adequate amount of DNA from the
samples to be compared. For crime scene samples, a quarter-sized blood stain
or a dime-sized semen stain is usually required. Following a complex,
multi-step procedure," a process known as autoradiography yields an X-ray
showing autorads or bands of DNA. This autoradiograph is "often said to
resemble the bar code appearing on grocery store packages, and has become
widely known as the 'DNA fingerprint.""' 2
. Once these prints are created, the pattern of bands produced by the
suspect's or victim's DNA is compared to the pattern obtained from the
unknown sample. A DNA match occurs when the three to five autorads that are
examined are determined to be alike. 3 Once a match is made, data bases
developed by forensic DNA laboratories are consulted to statistically calculate
the uniqueness of the band pattern based on the frequency with which each
band appears in the relevant population, as determined by the race of the DNA
contributor. The probability of a random match on multiple bands can be

7. Fleming, supra note 4, at 318. The two tests are referred to as (1) "restriction fragment
length polymorphism" (RFLP) analysis and (2) "polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification,"
or "allele-specific probe," analysis. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 319.
10. Traditional means of identification include "ABO typing, human leukocyteantigen (HLA)
typing, and the typing of red cell enzymes and serum proteins." Id. at 324.
11. For a detailed explanation of RFLP analysis, see id. at 320-22.
12. Fleming, supra note 4, at 321.
13. Dinkins, _

S.C. at ____, 462 S.E.2d at 60.
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computed by applying the "product rule," which multiplies the frequencies with
which each band appears in the data base. 4 For example, if one autorad is
found in fifty percent of the relevant population and another autorad is found
in twenty percent of the relevant population, the probability of a coincidental
match of the two DNA prints is ten percent. As noted in Dinkins, "most of the
controversy surrounding DNA population frequency statistics involves the
product rule."'"
South Carolina's standard for the introduction of novel scientific evidence
allows admission of DNA analysis. Under the test formulated in State v.
Jones6 "admissibility depends upon 'the degree to which the trier of fact
must accept, on faith, scientific hypotheses not capable of proof or disproof in
court and not even generally accepted outside the courtroom.""' 17 Likewise,
under federal law, the admissibility of a scientific theory or technique depends
on its achievement of general acceptance in the scientific field from which it
comes.' s Accordingly, the court concluded in State v. Ford9 that DNA
identification had gained general acceptance in the scientific community and
held that DNA test results declaring matches are admissible, subject to attack
for relevancy or prejudice." The court also held that the execution of the test
was subject to attack on a case-by-case basis.2'
In Dinkins the court dealt with admissibility of population frequency
statistics. The court first addressed the admissibility of such statistics under
South Carolina Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a),2" which provides: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise."' In holding the DNA popula-

14. See Eldon D. Wedlock, Jr., DNA Goes Round andRound, S.C. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at
9, 12-13.
15. __ S.C. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 60.
16. 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).
17. Id. at 731, 259 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975)).
18. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). But see Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
supersedes the Frye test in federal trials; rules 702 through 705 now control the admissibility of
scientific evidence in the form of expert testimony).
19. 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990).
20. Id. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784; see also State v. China, 312 S.C. 335, 340-42, 440 S.E.2d
382, 385 (Ct. App. 1993).
21. See Ford,301 S.C. at 490, 392 S.E.2d at 784.
22. S.C. R. Crim. P. 24(a) was repealed effective Sept. 3, 1995. Expert testimony is now
governed by rules 702 through 705 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, which are virtually
identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
23. Dinkins,__ S.C. at _ 462 S.E.2d at 60 (quoting S.C. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (repealed
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tion frequency statistics admissible, the court noted that the jury should be
allowed to determine, on its own, the reliability of the statistics--effectively
recognizing the jury's freedom to believe or disbelieve the experts. 2 4 The
Dinkins court also held that population frequency statistics are subject to attack
on relevancy and prejudice grounds."
Dinkins argued that the statistics were inadmissible because their
prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.26 He urged that the
"probability figure of one in 2.9 billion unfairly prejudiced him because the
jury may have perceived this [astronomical] statistic as infallible."2 7 However, Dinkins failed to cross-examine SLED's DNA expert or present his own
experts to demonstrate why the statistics were flawed or unreliable. 3
Therefore, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that the probative value of
the statistical evidence outweighed any unfair prejudicial effect.29
The Dinkins opinion fails to address a number of substantive factors
identified by other courts as affecting the admissibility of DNA statistical
evidence. In other words, Dinkins's failure to cross-examine SLED's DNA
expert or present his own DNA evidence clearly leaves unanswered the
question of whether the probative value of statistical evidence outweighs its
potential prejudicial impact. This question is a source of judicial debate
nationwide.
A Florida appellate court, following the majority ofjurisdictions, explained
that although DNA identification "is highly technical, incapable of observation
and requires the jury to either acceptor reject the scientist's conclusion[s]," this
does not render the evidence unreliable." In another decision, the Florida
appellate court upheld the admission of expert testimony that there was only
one chance in 234 billion of finding someone other than the defendant with the
same DNA band pattern exhibited by the blood and semen samples." Given
the current human population of five billion, defense counsel objected that the
expert's probability figures were so overwhelming that if believed by the jury,
they would establish the defendant's identity as the rapist beyond a reasonable

1995)).
24. Id. at __ 462 S.E.2d at 60.
25. Id. at ___ 462 S.E.2d at 60.
26. Dinkins relied on State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 401 S.E.2d 146 (1991), which
explicitly adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 balances prejudice against probity to
determine admissibility.
27. Dinkins, _
S.C. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 60; see also Wedlock, supra note 14, at 13
(arguing that the "statistically untutored are likely to receive [statistical] testimony . . .as
conclusive proof that the defendant left the evidence").
28. Dinkins,__ S.C. at ___, 462 S.E.2d at 60-61.
29. Id.at __ 462 S.E.2d at 61.
30. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
31. Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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doubt and thereby invade the jury's province as the ultimate finder of fact.3 2

Although the court acknowledged the major discrepancies between the victim's
description of her assailant and the defendant's appearance, it reasoned that the
average juror could weigh the credibility of such figures when properly
presented and challenged.33 The court noted that one of defense counsel's
tasks is to subject expert witnesses to vigorous cross-examination or to attack
the scientific foundation upon which statistical proofs are based. 4
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, held that DNA identification test
results are generally admissible but ruled that population frequency statistics
associated therewith are inadmissible due to their potentially exaggerated
impact on the jury.35 In State v. Schwartz an independent laboratory reported
that all bands in the DNA print obtained from the victim's blood also appeared
in the sample taken from the defendant's clothes and that the frequency of the
pattern in the Caucasian population was approximately one in thirty-three
billion.36 The court explained that cross-examination and limiting instructions
may not be sufficient to adequately safeguard against the danger of juries
giving undue weight and deference to statistical evidence.37 Likewise, the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that "the better practice in Wyoming should be
to not refer to the statistical probability of duplication when introducing DNA
test results."3 In Rivera v. State the Wyoming court noted that although the
theory underlying DNA testing is generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community, a problem arises because "it would be possible for [a] jury to draw
[an] inference [of guilt] from statistical probabilities associated with the DNA
evidence alone."39

The National Research Council (NRC) has calculated conservative "ceiling
frequencies" for the relevant strands of DNA in an effort to reduce the
controversy over the prejudicial effect of statistical evidence." The use of
this ceiling method prompted the Minnesota Supreme Court to create a DNA
exception to the rule against admission of statistical probability evidence in
criminal prosecutions.4

32. Id. at 694.
33. Id. at 696.
34. Id. at 697.
35. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989).
36. Id. at 424.
37. Id. at 428.
38. Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 942 (Wyo. 1992).
39. Id. at 942.
40. For a discussion of ceiling frequencies, see D.H. Kaye, The ForensicDebutof the National
Research Council'sDNA Report: PopulationStructure, Ceiling Frequenciesand the Needfor
Numbers, 34 JURIMErRICS J. 369 (1994).
41. See State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994).
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Another criticism of DNA identification testing is the "lack of consensus
on the proper data base size from which it is acceptable to project statistics for
an entire population."42 In Dinkins the court noted in a footnote that SLED
developed its data base using the DNA of only 250 blacks in South Carolina. 3 A Delaware court in State v. Pennell' held that statistics regarding
band frequency derived from blood samples taken of only 250 people were
inadmissible, because even the slightest misidentification
"could substantially
45
alter the frequency calculated from that data base.
In Andrews v. State46 a Florida court upheld the admissibility of statistical
evidence derived from a data base of 710 samples.47 According to expert
testimony, the American Association of Blood Banks had concluded that a base
of 200 to 500 samples is sufficient to produce reliable statistical results.43
The technical specificity of DNA statistical identification raises more
questions with regard to its reliability. The extraordinarily exacting procedure
requires a high degree of expertise and uniformity in testing conditions before
reliable results can be obtained.49 Many critics have pointed out the lack of
uniform standards relating to proper DNA testing procedures. For instance,
some critics argue that the laboratory conditions under which DNA identification takes place differ so greatly from true forensic conditions that the
reliability of the results is significantly diminished.
DNA matching in
criminal cases will typically require analysis of blood or semen stains that are
small, old, and exposed to adverse environmental conditions."
These
conditions tend to "break up or 'degrade' DNA into smaller fragments, thereby
reducing the number of bands visible after RFLP analysis, and making the
interpretation of prints more difficult."52 Also, samples may be contaminated
by chemical agents in the material on which they are deposited, resulting in
misleading band sizes or positions. 3
42. Fleming, supra note 4, at 326.
43. Dinkins,S.C. at __ n.4, 462 S.E.2d at 61 n.4.
44. 584 A.2d 513 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
45. Id. at 522.
46. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
47. Id. at 850.
48. Id.; see also People v. Miles, 577 N.E.2d 477, 484 (II1.App. Ct. 1991) (data base of 200
to 300 blood samples sufficient); People v. Shi Fu Huang, 546 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1989) (expert testimony that 200 individual samples are usually required for a valid statistical
analysis of an ethnic population group).
49. Dan L. Burk, DNA Fingerprinting:Possibilitiesand Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 455, 465 (1988).
50. Anthony Pearsall, DNA Printing:The Unexamined "Witness" in CriminalTrials,77 CAL.
L. RFv. 665, 671-72 (1989).
51. Id. at 670-72; see also State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (W.Va. 1989) (evidence
inadmissible because insufficient DNA was recovered from semen stains to yield a band pattern).
52. Fleming, supranote 4, at 325; see also Pearsall, supra note 50, at 668-69.
53. Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: UnreliableScientific Evidence
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As a result of such criticism, DNA testing procedure guidelines have been
issued by agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Technical
Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (TWGDAM) and the California
Association of Crime Laboratory Directors (CACLD).54 The testing laboratory's poor performance on a blind proficiency test given by the CACLD,
along with failure to comply with all minimum standards and guidelines
developed by the CACLD and TWGDAM, was cited as grounds for the
inadmissibility of DNA test results in Schwartz.
The subjectivity of interpreting band patterns is another major weakness
of DNA analysis.56 Again, critics point to the lack of standards or generally
accepted objective criteria for determining a match between prints.5 ' This
inconsistency "creates a danger that DNA prints of different individuals will be
mistakenly declared to match.""8
There are also non-technical arguments relating to the way in which DNA
testing has been developed and marketed. The dominance of private
commercial laboratories in the technique's development and their financial
dependence on its judicial acceptance raises significant questions regarding
scientific and legal reliability of test results. Accordingly, "parties and the
courts may find it difficult to locate experts with relevant experience who can
render a truly objective opinion on the matter."59
Despite these considerable concerns, the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the admission of DNA statistical evidence in Dinkins. However,
because Dinkins failed to cross-examine SLED's DNA expert or present his

Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465, 481-82 (1990).
54. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422,426 (Minn. 1989). But cf People v. Venegas, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 856 (1995) (DNA evidence inadmissible when independent experts did not testify
concerning general scientific acceptance of FBI's protocols).
55. 447 N.W.2d at 426-28; see also State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989)
(evidence inadmissible due to failure to establish the reliability of the testing laboratory's
methods); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (DNA identification
evidence inadmissible because the testing laboratory failed to perform scientifically accepted
procedures to resolve test result ambiguities and discrepancies). But see People v. Mehlberg, 618
N.E.2d 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (DNA evidence admissible even though testing laboratory had
less-than-perfect results on proficiency tests and FBI's procedure had never been subject to
proficiency testing by any outside agency).
56. See Jon P. Thames, It's Not Bad Law--It'sBad Science: Problemswith Expert Testimony
in Trial Proceedings, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 545, 555 (1995).
57. See Hoeffel, supra note 53, at 486-87.
58. Fleming, supra note 4, at 326; see also William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA
Typing: Acceptance and Weight ofthe New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 87-89
(1989).
59. Fleming, supra note 4, at 327; see also Hoeffel, supra note 53, at 499-502; Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 783 (Va. 1989) (noting defendant's inability to find one
qualified expert to contradict either the theory of DNA printing or the statistics generated
therefrom).
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own expert testimony, the decision leaves the issue largely untouched. The
court pointed out that counsel for a party opposing the admission of DNA
statistical evidence has opportunities to refute the relevance and reliability of
such evidence. 0 Thus, defendants should vigorously cross-examine the
proponent's laboratory experts conceming the testing procedures used, the size
of the data base from which the calculations were derived, and the reliability
of test results.'
Testimony elicited may be sufficient to show that the
statistical evidence is unreliable or that the prejudicial effect outweighs the
probative value.
James L. Ward, Jr.

60. Dinkins, _ S.C. at __, 462 S.E.2d at 60; see Thames, supra note 56, at 557 ("any
reasonably effective defense can mount a substantial attack on [DNA] evidence").
61. See Fleming, supra note 4, at 331-33; Thames, supra note 56, at 555 (confrontation of
DNA evidence "is probably best limited to attacks on the test as conducted").
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IV.

THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN A
CITIZEN'S ARREST

In the recent case of State v. Cooney,' the South Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether deadly force can ever be used in a citizen's
arrest. Specifically, the Cooney court held that the issue of whether
reasonable force had been used in a citizen's arrest is a factual question for the
jury. 2 Thus, the court did not foreclose the possibility that a citizen may use
deadly force when arresting a felon.
Prior to the events at issue in Cooney, burglars had broken into Cooney
and Hale's plumbing supply business and stolen copper tubing. After the last
such burglary Cooney and Hale discovered some copper tubing hidden in
garbage bags behind their place of business. 3 They waited near the hiding
place for the return of the burglar.4 When Carlton Williams finally came for
the tubing, Hale and Cooney approached him with loaded pistols and informed
him that they were going to turn him over to the police. Hale and Cooney
5
allegedly questioned Williams and obtained a confession to the burglary.
Williams then attempted to flee, and Hale and Cooney both fired at him. Both
claimed that they were aiming at the ground. However, bullets struck
Williams in both hips, and he died at the scene. After shooting at Williams as
he fled, both defendants left the scene. Cooney returned the next morning,
found the body, and reported the homicide to the police. 6 Thomas Cooney
and James Clinton Hale were indicted and tried for murder.
At trial the jury convicted Cooney but acquitted Hale.7 Cooney posited
citizen's arrest as a defense to the charge of murder, but the trial judge ruled
as a matter of law that the use of deadly force was not justified in these factual
circumstances. Thus, the trial judge did not charge the jury on the law of
citizen's arrest.' Basing his ruling on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Tennessee v. Garner,9 the trial judge determined that the use of
deadly force to apprehend a suspect was not justified when the suspect posed
no immediate threat to the person making the arrest or others. The trial judge
also concluded that the state statute governing citizen's arrest does not
authorize the use of deadly force."

1. __ S.C. _, 463 S.E.2d 597 (1995).
2. Id. at
, 463 S.E.2d at 599.
3. Id. at _,463 S.E.2d at 598.
4. Id. at
, 463 S.E.2d at 598.
5. Id. at
463 S.E.2d at 598.
6. Id. at _,463 S.E.2d at 598.
7. Id. at
, 463 S.E.2d at 598.
8. Id. at
463 S.E.2d at 598.
9. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
10. Cooney,
S.C. at ___ 463 S.E at at 598 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-10 (Law.
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Cooney claimed three errors on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme
Court: that the trial judge (1) failed to instruct the jury on the law of citizen's
arrest, (2) improperly excluded testimony of William's involvement in the
burglaries of the plumbing store, and (3) refused to instruct the jury on the law
of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter."
The supreme court reversed the trial court, finding error in the trial judge's
decision not to instruct the jury on the law of citizen's arrest. The court ruled
that Garnerwas distinguishable because Cooney, unlike the police officers in
Garner, was acting free of state influence when he attempted to arrest the
burglar. 12
The Cooney court primarily relied upon State v. Nall. 3 In Nail the court
held: "If after notice of arrest, the suspect attempts to flee or forcibly to resist
arrest, the person making the arrest may use reasonable means to effect it."' 4
Additionally, the court relied on the citizen's arrest statute, which states that
any person may arrest a felon or thief upon "(a) view of a felony committed,
(b) certain information that a felony has been committed or (c) view of a
larceny committed."' 5
The court determined that Cooney had "certain information" that a felony
had been committed. 6 Therefore, the trial judge should have allowed the jury
to determine whether Cooney satisfied the Nail standard by using "reasonable
means" to effectuate an arrest. 7 Further, the court pointed that "[tihe
determination of reasonableness depends upon the facts of the case and is a
question for the jury unless there is no evidence to support a finding of

Co-op. 1985)).
11. Id.at __.. 463 S.E.2d at 598-600.
12. Id.at _... 463 S.E.2d at 599. More explicitly, the South Carolina Supreme Court
distinguished Garnerbecauseit involved a determination ofcivil rather than criminal liability. See
id. at____ 463 S.E.2d at 599 ("The Fourth Amendment proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures does not apply to searches by private individuals not acting as agents of the State."
(citing Peters v. State, 302 S.C. 59, 61, 393 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1990))). Garnerwas a federal, civil
rights case that involved state action; Cooney was a criminal murder case that involved a private
citizen acting free of state influence. On the other hand, one could also argue that Garnershould
apply. Cooney was a state actor because he effectuated the arrest under a state statute.
Furthermore, the reasonableness interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is no greater in a
police arrest than in a citizen's arrest.
13. 304 S.C. 332, 404 S.E.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1991).
14. Id. at 339, 404 S.E.2d at 207. More specifically, in Nail a citizen attempted to arrest the
defendants after his daughter informed him that her convertible top had been slashed. Id. at 33435, 404 S.E.2d at 204. The court held that the citizen's arrest was unlawful because the citizen
had not given the defendant notice of the arrest and because the citizen had no authority to arrest
for a misdemeanor committed outside his presence. Id. at 341, 404 S.E.2d at 207-08.
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
16. Cooney, _ S.C. at ___ 463 S.E.2d at 599.
17. Id.at ___, 463 S.E.2d at 599 (citing Nail, 304 S.C. at 339, 404 S.E.2d at 207).
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reasonableness."' 8 The supreme court rejected the appellant's second claim of
error. That is, the court affirmed the trial judge's decision to exclude testimony
implicating Williams in the burglaries. 9 The right to make a citizen's arrest
hinges not on the actual guilt of the suspect, but on whether the arrestor has
certain information that a felony has been committed.20 Under Nail, an arrest,
if reasonable, would still be lawful even if the arrestee later is found innocent.2' Thus, evidence, unknown to Cooney at the time of the shooting, that
tended to show Williams's involvement in the burglaries was found irrelevant.
Finally, the court affirmed the trial judge's refusal to charge the jury on
the law of involuntary and voluntary manslaughter. The court reasoned that the
evidence simply did not support such a charge.22 The appellant admitted that
he intentionally shot a gun above Williams's head, so a charge on involuntary
manslaughter was inappropriate.' A charge on voluntary manslaughter was
also inappropriate because no evidence indicated that Cooney acted in a sudden
heat of passion.24

South Carolina has two statutes that authorize an arrest by a citizen.25
The Cooney court focused on South Carolina Code section 17-13-10(b), which
allows citizen's arrests based on "certain information" pointing to the felony
status of the perpetrator. Taking a literalist approach, the court affirmed the
exclusion of evidence of guilt not available prior to arrest.2 6 Cases like
Cooney beg the question: "Should citizens have to show something more than
just certain information?" Should they have to show that they arrested the
correct person? That is, the guilt of the arrestee seems even more relevant in
homicide cases.
Section 17-13-20 allows for a citizen's arrest in unusual circumstances and
further dictates the means to be used in such arrests:
A citizen may arrest a person in the nighttime by efficient means as the
darkness and the probability of escape render necessary, even if the life of
the person should be taken, when the person:

18. Id. at _ 463 S.E.2d at 599.
19. Id. at ___, 463 S.E.2d at 599.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
21. Id. at ___ 463 S.E.2d at 600.
22. Id. at ____ 463 S.E.2d at 600.
23. Id. at __, 463 S.E.2d at 600 (citing Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 177,414 S.E.2d 144,
147 (1992)).
24. Id. at__, 463 S.E.2d at 600 (citing State v. Norris, 253 S.C. 31, 35, 168 S.E.2d 564, 56566 (1969)).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-13-10, -20 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995).
26. Cooney, _ S.C. at __, 463 S.E.2d at 599-600.
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has committed a felony;
has entered a dwelling house without express or implied permission;
has broken or is breaking into an outhouse with a view to plunder;
has in his possession stolen property; or

(e) being under circumstances which raise just suspicion of his design
to steal or to commit some felony, flees when he is hailed.27
The language of this statute also could have been applied to Thomas Cooney's
situation. Williams had in his possession stolen copper tubing, and Cooney

attempted to make an arrest at night. The court was justified in its reversal
based on section 17-13-10, but also could have held that section 17-13-20
presented a question for the jury.
South Carolina is not the first jurisdiction to address the issue of whether
deadly force can be used to effectuate a citizen's arrest. Some state decisions
have fallen in line with South Carolina's. For instance, the Supreme Court of
Michigan also held Garner inapplicable to citizen's arrest cases.28 Washington's Supreme Court reached a decision similar to Cooney in 1962, basing
its ruling on a state statute that justified homicide involving a perpetrator
fleeing from an arrest.29
Some state courts, however, have held differently. In the recent case of
Prayor1'. State,3" the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a defendant is not
entitled to a jury instruction on the use of reasonable force in effecting a
citizen's arrest. Likewise, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that Garner is
applicable to citizen's arrests and "[t]he rights of a private citizen to use deadly
force are no greater than those of a police officer."31
After Cooney the question of how much force is reasonable when effecting
a citizen's arrest remains unanswered in South Carolina. The Cooney court
determined that this was a question for the jury.32 However, in leaving the
issue open the court has implied that the use of deadly force may be acceptable
in certain arrests. Perhaps this issue is better left to the legislature to decide.33

27. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 17-13-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
28. See People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Mich. 1990), cited in Cooney, _ S.C. at
463 S.E.2d at 599.
29. See State v. Clarke, 377 P.2d 449, 453 (Wash. 1962), cited in Cooney, _ S.C. at
463 S.E.2d at 599.
30. 456 S.E.2d 664, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
31. State v. Pecora, 622 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
32. Cooney, _ S.C. at ___ 463 S.E.2d at 599.
33. The approach taken by the Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v. Klein, 363 N.E.2d
1313, 1319 (Mass. 1977), suggests a legislative solution. In Klein the court adopted Model Penal
Code section 3.07, which imposes upon citizens the standards of force applicable to peace officers
when making an arrest.
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Nevertheless, the court sensed that the reasonableness of the force used in a
citizen's arrest is a question that should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Lee Ann Welch
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